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Brazil’s Economic Success: between the classic and 
the new developmental state models 
 
Dr Gabriel Garcia1 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, developing countries began questioning 
the neo-liberal development paradigm embedded in the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’ sponsored by international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The debate was reopened to discuss not 
only about which economic model was most suitable to promote development but 
also the role of the government and law in the development process. 
The debate has been fruitful and since the beginning of the new millennium Latin 
America has witnessed a healthy economic growth and reduction of poverty and 
social inequality. Positive trends are not even throughout the region. Poverty in some 
countries such as Dominican Republic and El Salvador has increased; in other like 
Mexico, Guatemala and Costa Rica, poverty has slowly decreased at a speed of less 
than 1 % per year while Peru and Uruguay are reducing poverty a faster pace of 
more than 4% per year. 
We cannot affirm that all countries in the region have followed the same path. They 
have followed different recipes from neoliberalism to what has been called the 21st 
Century Socialism, or a combination of neoliberal and welfare state policies. Brazil 
has been one of the examples that has attracted considerable attention from 
academics and experts globally and leading Law and Development scholars have 
argued that a new developmental state model is rising in Brazil.2  This paper aims at 
                                                          
1 Dr Garcia is a Lecturer in the School of Law at the University of Wollongong. He is also a member of 
the Legal Intersections Research Centre (LIRC), University of Wollongong. This paper was presented 
in the LIRC Panel Discussion on ‘The Critical Turn in Law and Development in Latin America: A 
Review of the Current State of Affairs (2000-2013)’, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 23 
October 2013. 
2 See e.g. David Trubek, Helena Alviar Garcia, Diogo Coutinho and Alvaro Santos (eds), Law and the 
New Developmental State, The Brazilian Experience in Latin American Context (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 
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reviewing this claim and responses whether a true ‘new’ approach has been 
advanced by the Brazilian state since 2002. The main argument supported by 
preliminary research is that the Brazilian approach seems to adopt some of the key 
features of the old Japanese developmental state. 
 
Latin America and the Developmental State 
The region has a long history of trials and errors of different approaches to economic 
growth and development in general.3  Latin America was a region highly influenced 
by the United Stated until the end of the 1990s. International financial institutions 
such and the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as regional 
institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank played a very relevant role in 
the region in the same period. To illustrate, Latin America has been the most 
important client of the World Bank for its Law and Judicial program where the 
institution allocated 30% of the funds committed to the theme between 1987 and 
2011 in comparison to 25% in Europe and Central Asia and 20% in Africa. 
The original Law and Development movement was built on Max Weber’s work.4 For 
Weber, one of the factors that supported the successful industrialisation of Europe 
and the modernisation of its economy was the rational legal system adopted across 
that continent. For a rational legal system, Weber understood a system that was 
governed by formal law (legislation) where disputes were adjudicated by professional 
courts and well-educated lawyers constructed a bridge between the system and 
common people.5  
During the initial Law and Development wave emerged the original developmental 
state is Latin America in which the government assumed the control of the economy, 
designing and implementing industrial policy. The main objective of the policy was to 
nurture and protect domestic industries.  It was the time of the import-substitution 
policies and the state enacted a complex network of laws and regulations to restrict 
                                                          
3 For an excellent analysis of the different Law and Development movements, see See e.g., David M. 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos, 'Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and the 
Emergence of a New Critical Practice' in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and 
Economic Development/A Critical Appraisal (2006) 
4 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth, 
Claus Wittich (1978). 
5 Weber conceded that England was an exception of a country that achieved development without a 
rational legal system. 
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foreign investment, provide incentives for local industries and protect domestic 
enterprises from external competition. 
The second moment of law and development came in the 1980s influenced by what 
is known as the Washington Consensus, an agenda inspired by neoliberal principles 
that sought to open goods and financial service markets to foreign investors and the 
dismantling of the developmental state. At this time, international actors stressed the 
importance of institutions for markets, including ‘good governance’ and ‘the rule of 
law’.6  Thus, law was used to reduce the role of the state in the economy and for 
example privatise state-owned enterprises while strengthening the regulatory and 
supervisory role of the state. 
Late in the 1990s due to the failure of the neo-liberal agenda to deliver tangible 
results, experts started to look at what was called the comprehensive development 
framework that looks at development in a more holistic way.7 This framework 
brought the state back into the development equation and recognises that it plays a 
key role in achieving development goals.  Under this model the law was used to lay 
the basis for good and clean governments.  It was thought that better governments 
and institutional foundations would promote a market that was conducive to 
progress.  At the same time, it was thought that good government couldn’t exit 
without democratic institutions. So, reforms were oriented to strengthening the rule of 
law that protects private rights as well as other human rights such as free speech, 
woman rights and secret and free vote (see Table 1). 
It is in this third moment when Luis Inacio Lula da Silva is elected president in Brazil. 
According to Trubek and Santos, it is in this stage that started emerging a new 
developmentalism in Brazil.  As it will be explained later, I agree with Trubek that 
Brazil has adopted a developmental state approach since the election of Lula but it is 
not clear whether it is accurate to label the approach as ‘new’. To confirm whether a 
                                                          
6 See e.g., the Declaration issued by the IMF Interim Committee during the Fifty-First Annual Meeting 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Board of Governors in 1996, that claimed as one of the 
goals to encourage sustainable global growth the promotion of  ‘good governance in all its aspects, 
including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, 
and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper.’   
IMF, Summary Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors (1996) IMF. 
7 See e.g. the document launched in 1999 by the World Bank entitled ‘A Proposal for a 
Comprehensive Development Framework’ available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__CO-87.HTM  
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new developmentalism is emerging in Brazil, it is necessary to first understand what 
a developmental state model is, how it works; and then, reviews the features of the 
model that has been applied recently in Brazil to decide whether it is a new approach 
that differs from old models. 
 
Table 1. Law and Development Movements 
Movement Features Role of Law 
1st movement Modernisation theory 
Developmental state 
Import-substitution policies 
Protection of domestic industries 
Development understood in terms of economic growth 
Original developmental state in Latin America  
A rational legal system is essential to achieve development (Weber)  
Instrument of social change 
Legal framework supported role of the state in the economy 
2nd movement Neoliberalism 
Washington Consensus 
‘institutions matter for development’ 
IMF and World Bank programs 
Reduction of the state role in the economy 
Development understood in terms of economic growth 
Instrument of social change 
Law contributed reducing the role of the state in the economy 
rule of law and god governance essential to protect investors and 
business people  
Reform of business law to liberalise markets and trade 
Privatisations 
3rd movement  Comprehensive development approach 
Development is not only about economic growth but also 
standard of living of people 
New developmentalism 
Law is not only an instrument to achieve policy goals but also is a goal 
itself 
Rule of law should protect investors and businesses and well as human 
rights 
 
 
The Japanese Developmental State 
As it has been explained by Chalmers Johnson who undertook comprehensive 
studies of Japan industrialisation process, in a developmental state model, the state 
itself leads the process of industrialisation and development setting social and 
economic goals.8 The Japanese model was not a socialist developmental state or a 
communist state. In spite of being market oriented, it could not be classified as a 
pure capitalist model because the state using different tools directed the economy 
towards the achievement of a set of goals defined by the government. 
One of the first feature of the Japanese developmental state was the use of 
Industrial policies to allocate productive resources rather than relying solely on the 
                                                          
8 See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford University Press, 1982). 
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market. The state targeted specific industrial sectors, sometimes playing a key 
leadership role in prospecting potentially lucrative sectors and at other times playing 
a followership role in industrial sector in strengthening pre-existing private sector 
initiatives. This approach differs from the classic model adopted in Latin America that 
was basically driven by the state to protect domestic industries against foreign 
competition.  
The Japanese model was managed by a professional bureaucracy. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry Finance were the forces 
behind the successful implementation of economic and industrial policies. These 
departments recruited the brightest minds highly capable of policymaking, 
implementation, and policy monitoring and enforcement. Most professionals were 
recruited from the best Japanese universities.  The highest positions in these 
ministries were prestigious in the society.9 A well-educated bureaucracy was 
essential for the success of the model. 
Strong government-business collaboration was also a key element for the success of 
the developmental state in Japan.10 As referred by Peter Evans, the bureaucracy 
was not isolated from society but there were formal and informal mechanisms that 
facilitated the communication between the state and the private sector.11 Thus, the 
state promotes a collective project that was also assumed or supported by private 
companies. The public and private sectors collaborate to meet development goals 
defined by the government. 
In the case of the role played by law in the development of Japan, most scholars 
agree that law as understood in the West was not a primary factor behind the 
Japanese successful development.12  On the contrary, the state used a kind of ‘soft 
law’ known as “administrative guidance”.13  This was like recommendations or not 
                                                          
9 Ibid, 20.  
10 Ibid, 21-22. 
11 Peter Evans, In Search of the 21st Century Developmental State’ (Working Paper No 4, Centre for 
Global Political Economy at the University of Sussex, December 2008) 6. 
12 See Frank Upham, ‘Speculation on Legal Informality: On Winn’s Relational and the Marginalization 
of Law’ (1994) 28 Law and Society Review 233; See also John Ohnesorge, ‘Developing Development 
Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience’ (2007) 28 University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 219.  
13 See Christoph Antons, ‘Introduction’ in Christoph Antons (ed), Law and Development in East and 
Southeast Asia (Routledge-Curzon, 2003) 3. 
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binding-advices used by the bureaucracy to direct the economy and the industrial 
sector.  It was far from what we know as the rule of law. This discretionary powers 
enjoyed by the bureaucracy was unsupervised and sometimes it wasn’t able to be 
judicially challenged.  
 
Brazil and the New Developmental State 
Brazil’s democracy is young and it was born in 1985 when the last military regime 
ended; however, it was in 1990 when the first president elected by direct popular 
vote took office Fernando Collor de Mello, after the passing of a new Constitution in 
1988. Collor de Mello and his successor Fernando Henrique Cardozo implemented 
neo-liberal economic and legal reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus.  
Between 1990 and 2001, the country suffered one economical and financial crisis 
after another and the country entered into five Stand-By Arrangements with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) during that period.  
The political and economic environment started changing with the election of Luis 
Inacio Lula da Silva in 2002. Lula was not a fan of the IMF. He was a union leader 
who opposed IMF programs in Brazil. Prior to the 2002 elections when he was 
elected, the IMF convinced the outgoing government to sign an agreement in which 
any new government would be committed to continue working with the 
macroeconomic policies implemented by Brazil in coordination with the IMF since the 
1990s.  The idea was to reduce ‘fears’ of investors about the political future of the 
country and guarantee that if Lula won the elections, he would continue applying the 
same neo-liberal policies. 
Lula’s government was clear that neoliberal ideas would not work by themselves in 
Brazil and it was necessary the state intervention to overcome structural obstacles to 
growth. It is from this point that Brazil started to follow its own path to development 
and what they have called new developmentalism or state activism. 
After taking office, Lula was pragmatic and did not depart suddenly from the IMF 
tutelage and indeed he agreed to enter into a new Stand-by Arrangement in 2003; 
however, this new agreement made clear that the goal of the government was not 
only to strengthen macroeconomic stability and accelerate economic growth but also 
improve social condition.  To achieve the social goal, the government launched a 
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transitory program called Zero Hunger.  Two years later, in 2005, Brazil fully paid its 
debt with the IMF. Lula knew it was necessary to totally repay the IMF debt to regain 
autonomy in the design and implementation of public policies. 
Lula and his advisors designed the new approach using as basis some of the 
policies of the predecessor presidents.14 For Lula’s government was important to 
maintain monetary stability and kept policies such as control of the inflation, 
openness of markets to foreign investors and independence of the central bank.  
The second features of the new developmentalism is the reintroduction of industrial 
policy in 2004, the Industrial Technological and Foreign Trade Policy designed to 
foster selected domestic industries (e.g. semiconductors, software and medicines); 
and encourage innovation. The policy was later replaced in 2008 by the Program for 
Productive Development that sought to increase efficiency of the economy and 
promote specific industrial sectors such as aviation, mining, steel, oil and gas. The 
policy also targets education, increase investment in research and strengthen the 
legal framework for business and investment.   
The most recent plan is the Greater Brazil launched in 2011 by president; Dilma 
Rouseff. This plan seeks to improve local industry competitiveness to sustain growth 
and job creation.  Some critics argue that it is not a real industrial plan but a set of 
tax and trade-related measures offered to the local industry as a short-term relief 
from foreign competition (subsidies). 
The design and implementation of industrial policies has been seen as a positive 
step by the Brazilian private sector that has been closely working with the 
government in the definition of these policies in informal setting as well as in various 
councils created by the state.  The government didn’t renationalise private industries 
like the cases of Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina.  However, it has been 
reported that 72% of Brazilian companies had no knowledge of the Greater Brazil 
Plan.15 
                                                          
14 For a more comprehensive accounts of the policies implemented in Brazil see, David Trubek, Diogo 
Coutinho and Mario Schapiro, ‘New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Law’ in  David 
Trubek, Helena Alviar Garcia, Diogo Coutinho and Alvaro Santos (eds), Law and the New 
Developmental State, The Brazilian Experience in Latin American Context (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 28. 
15 Brazil-US Business Council, A Greater Brazil? Industrial Policy, Competitiveness and Growth 
(2012), 2. 
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The government also worked on improving the quality of the public service hiring 
people with technical expertise rather than political connections in order to 
professionalise the state’s bureaucracy. 
One of the features of the new developmentalism that is perhaps real new and 
different from the classic developmental state is the importance places by Brazilian 
governments on a social agenda since 2003.16  A set of programs have targeted 
reduction of poverty, inequalities and the reinsertion of people that have been 
excluded from the formal economic system. 
Bolsa Familia the flag social program could be considered as an equivalent of the 
Australian Family tax benefits which are novel for a Latin America country. BFP is a 
conditional cash transfer that benefits people who are considered extremely poor (a 
monthly income of less than $ 75, the minimum wage is Brazil is $ 300 per month). 17 
The payment is between $ 41 and 82 depending of several variables. For example a 
person who has a monthly income of $ 50 will received a basis fixed payment ($40) 
plus other payments depending of the number of teenagers in the family attending 
school and the number of other children. The main idea is that the family reaches a 
per capita monthly income of $41. To receive payments, people must meet certain 
health and education requirements such as children must commit to a vaccination 
schedule and medical monitoring of the growth of the children under 7 year of age, 
pregnant and breastfeeding women should have prenatal checks or regular medical 
check.  In the case of education children and teenagers must be enrolled in the 
school and have at least 75% of class attendance.  
Social legal scholars who have recently studied the economic success of Brazil have 
place great importance on the 1988 Constitution that have contributed to improve 
state capacity and provide the basis for the state activism; however, it is unclear how 
the new constitution have positively affected the development process. If experts can 
draw a clear link between both factors, this is, between the successful development 
record and the 1988 Constitution, Brazil will then differ from nations such as 
Venezuela and Bolivia that have adopted new Charters that have been built based 
                                                          
16 See Trubek, Coutinho and Schapiro, above n 13. 
17 Diogo Coutinho, ‘Descentralization and Coordination in Social Law and Policy: The Bolsa Familia 
Program’ in David Trubek, Helena Alviar Garcia, Diogo Coutinho and Alvaro Santos (eds), Law and 
the New Developmental State, The Brazilian Experience in Latin American Context (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 303.  
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on an humanistic approach to development but they both have failed to delivered 
more positive results in term of social, political and economic development. 
Another legal aspect that has been identified as a contributor of the success of the 
new developmentalism in Brazil is the use of a ‘flexible’ approach to law. Under this 
conception, law is not seemed as an immovable instrument with lack of capacity to 
react to new challenges but it is a tool that provides flexibility for experimentation and 
collaboration. For example, Trubek, mentions a few examples such as partnership 
agreements with academic institutions where the government provides grants to 
develop new products, and the loan contracts drafted and signed by the Brazil 
Development Bank (BNDES) that include non-binding performing criteria, staged 
disbursement and constant monitoring of BNDES through shared governance 
mechanisms. The author of this paper does not see the novelty in these instruments 
of law and it reminds the flexibility granted by Japanese law to the professional 
bureaucracy to interpret and enforce law using administrative guidance. 
Another legal aspect mentioned by the advocates of the new developmentalism is 
the way how Brazil has learned to use the mechanisms of international law, 
particularly the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) mechanisms for the solution of 
trade disputes. The WTO is a child of the Washington Consensus. According to most 
of the agreements completed within the WTO, developing countries that joined the 
Organisations had extended transitional periods to implement the WTO provisions 
but they became enforceable after 2000 (except for least developed countries). 
Thus, these mechanisms rather than new were created at least ten years earlier and 
they are more a tool of neoliberalism. What it is true is that Brazil has been active in 
the WTO and has filed 26 cases and has acted as a third party in other 77 cases 
while it has been the respondent in 14 cases. 
The influence of Brazil in other international forums has also grown particularly since 
it started joining forces with India, China, Russia and South Africa. At home, a 
combination of high inflation, a spurt in violence crime, poor public services and 
increase of public spending due to the Confederation Cup and the organisation of 
the World Cup in 2014 contributed to massive street protests in the biggest cities. 
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Conclusions 
Some experts have argued that a new developmental state model is rising is Latin 
America, particularly in Brazil. Whilst a few components of the approach could be 
labelled ‘new’, other features such as an industrial policy, state and private sector 
collaboration, professional bureaucracy and ‘flexible’ law resemble the key elements 
of the Japanese developmental state as described by Chalmers Johnson in 1983. It 
is essential to undertake further comparative research to study in more detail the 
Brazilian model to arrive to more conclusive findings and decide whether a truly new 
model has been adopted. 
 
 
 
 
